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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Reversed The Magistrate's Order Denying 
Suppression Of Evidence Obtained From Colvin's Detention For Violating A 
Presumptively Valid Statute 
A. Introduction 
Concluding that I. C. § 49-808- which Colvin was detained for violating -
is unconstitutionally vague, the district judge reversed the magistrate judge's 
order denying Colvin's motion to suppress. (R., pp. 213-20.) The district court 
erred because its conclusion conflicts with United States Supreme Court 
precedent. Under that precedent, where an officer has probable cause to 
believe a defendant violated a presumptively valid law, arrest of that defendant is 
lawful even if the law is later declared unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). 
Colvin asserts that DeFillippo is inapplicable because § 49-808 was ruled 
unconstitutional in Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 201 0). 
(Respondent's brief, p. 14.) Colvin's argument is unavailing because Burton is 
factually distinguishable, and thus inapplicable here. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.) 
Even if I.C. § 49-808 were unconstitutionally vague, such conclusion 
would only preclude Colvin's prosecution for violating § 49-808. Under the 
Fourth Amendment, Colvin's detention by Officer Talbott for violating the 
presumptively valid § 49-808 was supported by a reasonable articulable 
1 
suspicion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-11.) Thus the magistrate correctly denied 
Colvin's suppression motion and the district court's order must be reversed. 1 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of an order granting or denying a suppression 
motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous, but 
the Court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). On 
review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's decision to 
determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on appeal." 
Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010); see also Losser 
v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). 
C. Under DeFillippo, Colvin Was Properly Detained For Violation of§ 49-808, 
And The Holding In Burton That § 49-808 Is Unconstitutionally Vague As 
Applied In That Case Is Inapplicable To Colvin On The Facts 
Under DeFillippo, a constitutionally valid seizure is not invalidated by a 
later determination that the law on which the seizure was based is 
unconstitutionally vague. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). The Court in 
1 Colvin also contends the state "is raising for the first time on appeal an issue 
not raised below," citing State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 334, 208 P.3d 734, 738 
(Ct. App. 2009). (Respondent's brief, p. 15.) The issue raised on this appeal is 
whether Colvin's motion to suppress was properly denied, which was squarely 
addressed by the district court below. Whether to accept or reject the legal 
analysis employed by the district court is subject to free review on appeal. State 
v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). As Colvin has failed 
to articulate how the state is in violation of the legal principle set forth in Stone, 
the state will not address it further. 
2 
DeFillippo noted, "Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are 
declared unconstitutional." .kL at 38. In that case as here, the law at issue was 
presumptively valid at the time of the violation. "Society would be ill-served if its 
police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which 
are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement." lsL 
Although Colvin acknowledges DeFillippo, he argues that § 49-808, as 
applied to Colvin, was declared unconstitutional in Burton. This argument is 
incorrect. In Burton, the Court determined that I.C. § 49-808 was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton. Burton, 149 Idaho at 748-49, 240 
P .3d at 935-36. The Court's determination was based on the fact that "there is 
no evidence of ... signage or other indicator that one lane was ending and the 
other surviving." & at 749, 240 P.3d at 936. Here, Colvin encountered signage 
indicating that his lane was ending and the other surviving. (R., p. 118; Tr., p. 
24, L. 12 - p. 25, L. 1.) Colvin's facts are distinguishable from those in Burton. 
Thus, the holding in Burton that § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague does not 
apply here. Colvin's contention that § 49-808 was "ruled unconstitutional" in 
Burton fails. (Respondent's brief, p. 14.) 
Finally, Colvin has failed to establish that his void for vagueness challenge 
is relevant to the suppression issue. Even if Colvin could have avoided 
conviction under § 49-808, it is undisputed that Colvin failed to signal when his 
lane merged with another. (R., pp. 118-19, 21 0.) On the facts, Officer Talbott 
had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Colvin's vehicle, consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. 
3 
App. 2006). Thus, Officer Talbott properly detained Colvin. The magistrate 
judge correctly denied Colvin's motion to suppress; the district court's order 
reversing the magistrate court should be reversed and this matter remanded for 
further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
appellate decision and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 31st day of July, 2014. 
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